In the tradition of the Eastern Catholic Churches, the mutual communion and collaboration between the Patriarch and the Synod of Bishops are fundamental to ecclesial governance. While the Patriarch exercises his pastoral leadership as the Church’s father and head, the Synod of Bishops embodies the Church’s shared responsibility and communion. The harmonious cooperation of these two bodies is therefore essential to the Church’s proper governance, the preservation of ecclesial communion, and the promotion of unity.

However, what is to be done when this relationship becomes seriously strained and reconciliation is no longer possible? More specifically, when it becomes evident that a change in leadership is necessary for the continued and orderly governance of the Church, but the Patriarch is unwilling to resign voluntarily, what canonical recourse is available to the Church? Until now, the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches (CCEO) had not provided a clear canonical procedure for addressing such a situation.

It is precisely to address this legal lacuna that, on 29 August 2026, Pope Leo XIV promulgated the Apostolic Letter Motu Proprio entitled “Mutual Concord” (Mutua Concordia). The document introduces significant amendments to canons 106 and 126 of the CCEO, establishing a specific canonical procedure for exceptional circumstances in which the relationship between the Patriarch and the Synod of Bishops of his Church has become seriously and irreparably compromised, leadership change has become necessary, and the Patriarch is unwilling to resign voluntarily.

Therefore, Mutua Concordia should not be understood merely as a temporary measure to a crisis in a particular Church; rather, it should be understood as a structural legal reform that addresses the absence of a clear canonical procedure empowering the Synod of Bishops to safeguard the communion and orderly governance of the Church in extraordinary circumstances arising from a leadership crisis.

At the same time, Mutua Concordia does not diminish the Pope’s supreme authority in any way. Rather, within the framework of papal authority, it gives the Synod of Bishops a more clearly defined canonical role and procedure for responding to extraordinary circumstances, grounded in shared responsibility and ecclesial communion.

Alternative Canonical Mechanism for Convening the Synod of Bishops

Canons 106 §§1–2 establish the authority and obligation of the Patriarch to convoke the Synod of Bishops in accordance with the norm of law. Recognising, however, that the Patriarch may fail to fulfil this responsibility or may be unable to do so, the newly added §3 of canon 106 provides an alternative mechanism. In such circumstances, the authority to convoke the Synod is entrusted to the senior-most bishop in terms of episcopal ordination who possesses the right to vote. According to the current provision of canon 102 §3, bishops who have not yet attained the age of eighty retain the right to vote.

If this senior-most bishop likewise fails to convoke the Synod, the authority passes successively to the next senior bishop who has the right to vote and is “available for” fulfilling this responsibility.

Thus, even in an extraordinary situation in which the Patriarch cannot convoke the Synod, a clear canonical mechanism is in place to ensure that the Synod of Bishops can be lawfully convened. Consequently, canon 106 §3 provides the necessary canonical mechanism for implementing the procedure prescribed in canon 126.

Major Changes to Canon 126

The patriarchal see becomes vacant when the incumbent Patriarch dies or resigns. The provisions governing this situation are set out in §§1 and 2 of canon 126. The present amendment adds three new paragraphs (§§3–5) to canon 126.

Under Canon 108 §3, the consent of one-third of the members is sufficient to place a new matter on the agenda of a Synod convened in accordance with the provisions of canons 106 § 1, n. 3. On this basis, where serious reasons exist, the Synod may include the question of the Patriarch’s resignation on its agenda and request that he resign (c. 126 §3).

However, if he is unwilling to do so, the senior-most bishop in episcopal ordination who has the right to vote may, as indicated above, undertake the procedure for electing a new president of the Synod. Under the presidency of the bishop so elected, a secret ballot shall be held on the removal of the Patriarch from office. If two-thirds of the members vote in favour, he shall communicate the matter to the Roman Pontiff.

Before the vote is taken, however, the Patriarch must be given a reasonable opportunity to explain his position and defend himself before the Synod. Canon 126 §4, however, does not specify in detail how this opportunity is to be provided.

Once the Synod’s decision receives the assent of the Roman Pontiff, the patriarchal office is considered vacant (c. 126 §4). Thereafter, the procedure for electing a new Patriarch may be initiated in accordance with the provisions of canon law.

Canon 126 §5 also empowers the Synod to make suitable provisions regarding the status of a Patriarch who has been removed from office. These may include retaining his title and honours, particularly during liturgical celebrations, assigning him, with his consent, a residence befitting his dignity, and providing him with the means necessary for his support in keeping with his title.

Although the amendments have been introduced into the canons concerning patriarchal Churches, these procedures also apply to Major Archiepiscopal Churches (c. 152).

Conclusion

In an extraordinary situation in which communion between the Patriarch and the Synod is seriously and irreparably compromised, these reforms provide a clear, orderly, and canonical means of addressing the crisis within the Synodal structure of the Eastern Churches.

The ultimate purpose of this reform is not to diminish the Patriarch’s authority, but to protect ecclesial communion, uphold the proper synodal character of the Eastern Churches, and ensure the Church’s unity, good order, and effective governance in communion with the Roman Pontiff. In this way, the reform seeks to provide a canonical remedy for situations in which the continuation of the existing relationship of governance itself becomes an obstacle to communion and the Church’s common good.

Rev. Dr. George Thekkekara